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Epistemology Shock: English Professors Confront Science
Ian Barnard
Chapman University

Jan Osborn
Chapman University
The shock of our title was precipitated by our diverse yet eerily congruent experiences as English
professors teaching courses where we were confronted by students, colleagues, and dispositions
entrenched in scientism, scientific disciplines, and a science-based understanding of the world.
These confrontations, rooted in the continuing legacy of 18th Century Cartesian constructions of
a mind/body duality, resonate with current STEM initiatives, with calls within our own field of
rhetoric and composition for more quantitative scholarship to justify the field itself, and with the
privileging of empirical research and science methodologies in the academy in general and
elsewhere. An exhaustive list of examples of this encroachment would be impossible here, but
the ones that impact our work most immediately include increasing demands for quantitative
assessments of the programs and courses we teach; the exponentially accelerating imperatives of
standardized testing in the K-12 schools that prepare our students; and the research grants we
apply for whose applications insist on “executive summaries,” “deliverables,” and discussions of
methodology, and assume equipment use as a major expenditure—concepts and research
frameworks from business, science, and the social sciences that are often alien to our work as
humanities scholars. And, indeed, these privilegings of science and scientific methodologies,
these demands for numbers and “facts,” cannot be separated from the current denunciation of
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“alternate facts” by liberals, however convenient it might be to imagine that some appeals to
facticity are more righteous than others.
These are the contexts that we recognize form and impact our places in the academy and
our work as teachers based in an English Department but working with students in many
disciplines. Although we do gesture to some pedagogical possibilities at the end of this article,
our purpose here is not primarily to pose classroom solutions for this privileging of science
methodologies—the result of a science/humanities duality—but rather to excavate the ways in
which this disposition manifests itself in our classes and impacts our students and us as English
teachers, challenging our disciplinary/disciplined ways of thinking, writing, reading, teaching;
and to think through the implications and consequences of these challenges.
As rhetoricians and scholars trained in the disciplines of English, and as college English
teachers, we both value close critical readings of facts and figures; we believe that all discourse
constructs and disseminates values, assumptions, and ideologies; we see qualitative research as
an integral component of any project that claims to gloss human and non-human cultures; we
connect reading and writing to understanding self and others, to empathy, to inquiry in a broad
and open context. Yet the calls for “randomized control studies” suggest that such connections
must be quantified, must be scientifically “validated,” that storytelling (whether fictional or
nonfictional, novelistic or essayistic) as a means of making meaning is suspect, that “data” and
“outcomes” and “measurement” is the only way to investigate and educate. Somehow, the very
idea of liberal arts, of broadening a human being’s experiences and knowledge rather than
“training” them for a profession, is suspect. What are our graduates going to do with a degree is
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often the question. We, on the other hand, wonder who they are going to be. But is such a
question even possible in this climate of big data and empirical studies and scientific
methodologies?1 And how do we avoid giving ourselves over to be cogs in a wheel that appears
to be grinding every more steadily toward a focus on “objectivity,” toward a scientism that has
been roundly challenged by the humanities for centuries? Can our discipline continue to work
with the subtle ways knowledge is produced and challenged if data mining is “becom[ing] the
methodological norm in Humanities research” (Braidotti 4)?

The World of Fact
Ian has been teaching an interdisciplinary upper division course with a critical animal
studies theme, while Jan has been co-teaching a series of courses with a colleague from
economics. In both cases, our courses have attracted students from a variety of majors, and we
have struggled to effectively address students who parade “facts,” truth,” and the scientism that
frames their disciplinary training to counter the world views and assertions forwarded by our
humanities-informed texts and methodologies that value experience as evidence and that see the
insights that artistic creation offers our understandings of “reality.” Often these students are
completely uncritical of scientific discourses, treating them as transparent and factual, seemingly
unaware of the ways in which these discourses are as much constructed as any other discourse,
and of the critiques of scientific pretentions to objectivity that have been made by feminists,
queer theorists, critical race theorists, critical legal scholars, poststructuralists, and even some
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scientists over the past half a century (Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
celebrated its 50th anniversary edition three years ago).2
Ian’s critical animal studies course attracts students from a variety of majors, some of
whom are simultaneously taking a course on evolution. The scientists, biologists, computer
scientists, and business majors in the group are the most reluctant to abandon ideologies of
scientific fact and objectivity, an unfortunate reflection on the other courses they are taking, or,
at least, on their inability to assimilate in the short term ideas they are confronting in those
courses that counter conventional wisdom about science, facts, and objectivity. A central tenet of
Critical Animal Studies holds that the human/non-human animal divide is a historically and
culturally specific construction, and that the representation of non-human animals across media
and in and through human imaginations plays a pivotal role in undergirding this construction
(see, e.g., DeMello).
Common tropes deployed to maintain a human/non-human animal hierarchy include
those that draw on measurements of reason, intelligence, and self-consciousness in order to
justify assertions of humans’ relatively greater achievements and worth compared to other
animals, and, some would argue, to rationalize humans’ mistreatment of other animals. Some
students in the class are simultaneously taking a course on evolution, and these, as well as other
class members, seem non-plussed at Ian’s suggestion that designations of intelligence are not
objective, and that depending on the criteria used, one could come to different conclusions about
who or what is “intelligent” (never mind the question about whether intelligence should be a
criterion for value in the first place). As Rosi Braidotti puts it,
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the humanist image of thought…sets the frame for a self-congratulating relationship of
Man to himself, which confirms the dominant subject as much in what he includes as
his core characteristics as in what he excludes as ‘other.’ (Braidotti 67).
There is a self-perpetuating cycle of accreditation that begins when I assume (sometimes
maliciously, sometimes out of ignorance) that x is valuable and important and ends when I
conclude that y is less worthy because y lacks x.
At times, Ian felt themself swimming against a huge tide of disbelief. In a discussion of
vegetarianism, the ways in which meat-eating is embedded as a normative practice in U.S.
culture, and the ethical issues around humans determining what their pets eat, what is the
humanities-trained social constructionist English professor to do when several high-performing
students recite facts from their evolution class about the tooth structure of dogs that “prove” that
dogs are designed to eat meat? Ian did not know how to respond, felt ill-equipped to respond, felt
unable to speak to these students in the language of science that they are speaking, felt the
teacher’s credibility slipping away...
Meanwhile, Jan has been co-teaching an innovative series of courses with a colleague
from economics. Called Humanomics, the program grew out of an extended discussion of the
fundamental disconnect, and often distrust, between scholars in the humanities and economics.
In fact, Jan was especially chosen for this job because of their expertise and experience as a
scholar and teacher in English. At the core of Humanomics courses is the concurrent reading of
literature and economic texts3; question-based, round table discussions; and team teaching.
However, while it sounds quite balanced to be exploring markets and exchange and ethics
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through economics and humanities texts, an unstated (or at least never explicitly stated)
perception of economics as fact and literature as fiction (or some odd antonym for facts)
permeates the classroom. And this binary construction of the dialoging texts is not neutral: “fact”
is always seen as having the upper hand. Adam Smith and Frederick Hayek and Michael Polanyi
and Thomas Sowell are taken seriously—obviously their ideas are to be valued—while Jane
Austen and John Milton and Emile Zola and Mohsin Hamid are suspect, just novelists, after all.
Even in a program with the intention of working across disciplinary barriers, the intention of
challenging the idea that economics is bereft of humanity, there is an underlying bias toward
facts that devalues the “structure of feeling” (to use Raymond Williams’ term) valued as an
analytic tool in English studies. Here, too, the accounting, business, marketing, and economics
majors are reluctant to abandon ideologies of scientific fact and objectivity; maybe no surprise
there, but when the sociology and political science and English majors get caught up in this bias,
the strength of the objectivity forces is clear. And while the students and professors discuss the
need for better understanding prosperity and markets through a capacity for questioning and
broadening our perspectives of the world, it seems the voices that dominate are those that sound
authoritative, that talk facts, as if they are disembodied from human beings. So much is in play
here, hundreds of years of scientism, of believing that reason rather than myth or the imagination
or the senses or intuition or emotion is the foundation for all knowing (Craig Smith 234). And of
believing that “reason” is transparent and universal, rather than itself a historical and cultural
construct.
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Working with a variety of majors in the Humanomics program, Jan has found that
students—even those in the Humanities—talk about “facts” and “truth” as if they are inherent in
the economics texts, allowing them to marginalize the literary texts they are reading at the same
time. Jan has been struck by how this way of conceptualizing knowledge puts the locus of
understanding outside the students themselves: “It’s there in the facts.” Students simply have to
memorize these facts or call upon them in a paper and they will be knowledgeable, right? The
possibility of ambiguity or of the worldview presented in literature as embodying knowledge or
any kind of truth seems outside their epistemological frame. Some recent excerpts from student
papers on Matt Ridley’s book on “how prosperity evolves,” The Rational Optimist, attest to
facticity’s allure:
•

“There is no doubt that progress does not reverse itself and moves us forward in a
positive way. Ridley uses facts to show this is the case” (1 October 2014).

•

“The view of the world through Wordsworth’s frame of reference is disheartening as
he denigrates society for ‘getting and spending.’ However, the tension in
Wordsworth’s poem is repudiated by the truth of reality, the progress in human
economics” (30 September 2014).

•

“These humanities texts are outdated, some being written in the early 1800s. Due to
this fact, it is reasonable to argue that Ridley is indeed correct on what makes a better
society. . . . If society wants to continue to improve and increase personal wealth,
trade and consumerism is indeed the reasonable choice” (1 October 2014).
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“Ridley examines situations based on factual evidence and statistics. . . . He would
find Steinbeck’s work probably meaningful, but insignificant in his quest to prove
why one should be a rational optimist” (27 September 2015).

•

“As so elegantly stated in Ridley’s well-reasoned and fact supported book, prosperity
is a direct result of interdependence” (1 October 2014).

•

“Ridley views the world scientifically, and uses number, graphs, percentages and
other data to get his point across. Thoreau views the world through his eyes alone”
(23 September 2014).
Jan and Jan’s colleague in the university’s Economic Science Institute have attempted to

challenge this scientism. In their course, Humanomics: Knowledge, Satire, and the Facts and
Values of Economics, they include a chapter from A Culture of Fact: England, 1550-1720, where
Barbara Shapiro explores the role of “fact” in the early modern period in England. Shapiro’s
work demonstrates that “the concept ‘fact’ itself has undergone considerable modification over
time” (1). Taking shape in the legal field, “fact” was concerned with “human actions or events”
(9). In the legal context, matters of fact did not refer to “established truth” but to an issue of
truth, a determination of what might be known without direct observation. Some matters of fact
could be proven false. In fact, there were references to “false fact” (64). From this initial
understanding, “fact” was transformed “from something that had to be sufficiently proved by
appropriate evidence to be considered worthy of belief to something for which appropriate
verification had already taken place” (31). Over time, a culture of fact developed, one where the
concept of “fact” was transferred to the natural world. “Fact,” which began as an epistemological
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process, was transformed into an impermeable conclusion of science, of rationality, of
empiricism, a term reserved for “certain knowledge” (77). This concept of fact was satirized by
Swift as early as 1726:
As these noble Houyhnhnms are endowed by Nature with a general Disposition to
all Virtues, and have no Conceptions or Ideas of what is evil in a rational Creature;
so their grand Maxim is, to cultivate Reason, and to be wholly governed by it. Neither
is Reason among them a Point Problematical as with us, where Men can argue with
Plausibility on both Sides of a Question; but strikes you with immediate Conviction; as
it must needs do where it is not mingled, obscured, or discoloured by Passion and
Interest... because Reason taught us to affirm or deny only where we are certain; and
beyond our Knowledge we cannot do either. (255)
Polanyi refers to the phenomenon Swift satirizes and that we have seen in our classes discussed
here as “scientific detachment” (vii). He establishes the concept of personal knowledge, a way of
knowing that “transcends the disjunction between subjective and objective” (300). The personal
acknowledges requirements independent of itself (use of a word, for example) while
acknowledging commitment of the self—realizing that “it is not the words that have meaning,
but the speaker who means something by them” (252). This way of conceiving of knowledge is
central to rhetorical studies and to the Humanities in general. Knowledge is personal, is created,
is multiple and dynamic. Knowledge for many of our students is outside the self; knowledge is
objective; and since they see science as “objective” and literature as “subjective,” they have
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embraced scientism and positivism as their epistemological framework. There is no participation
in the act of knowing in this epistemology; there is authority.
An attempt to challenge this dichotomy through Humanomics courses is a complicated
task, as illustrated most obviously in the student papers excerpted above where the authority of
the economic texts is reflected. Like Miles Corwin in his narrative of an economics professor
who caught him reading a book during class, student work often reflects the assumption that the
economic texts are where the knowledge resides. Even though they have an economics professor
who values literature, students’ reliance on the economic texts for support is paramount. The
business/econ/science students have not yet, like Corwin’s economics professor, “come to the
conclusion that [their] education was narrow and incomplete,” that “university officials who deemphasized the humanities, and students who dismissed their significance, were misdirected”
(Corwin 38).

The World of Fiction
We must interrogate the quantitative worldview by asking our students and colleagues “if
we are incapable of integrating multiple ways of knowing” and “whether the products of
scientific inquiry are the only guideposts to aid our progress” (Elaine Harding). J. M. Coetzee
offers such an interrogation in his foundational, genre-bending, interdisciplinary, and selfreflexive animal studies text, the “novel” The Lives of Animals. The book offers an instructive
allegory of the value of Jan and Ian’s humanities knowledge and education, and of how we might
productively use this knowledge and education to intervene into scientific and other discourses,
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as urged by Braidotti in her meditation on the place of the (post)humanities in posthuman
educational and social institutions.4 Coetzee’s text ends with a terrible coming together of
reason and emotion. John Bernard, a professor of physics and astronomy, is dropping his novelist
mother off at the airport after her rather tumultuous visits to his campus, during which she speaks
and debates passionately about the ethics of meat eating, amongst other animal-related topics.
Elizabeth Costello, the novelist, is haunted—tormented—by the hideous lives and deaths of
animals created and killed in the factory farming industries that produce meat for human
consumption and by the humans around her, including her son and his wife, Norma, who
explicitly or implicitly collude in the recurring Holocaust (Coetzee infamously compared the
quotidian human slaughter of animals for food to the Nazi Holocaust). Costello says to her son,
“I look into your eyes, into Norma’s, into the children’s, and I see only kindness,
human-kindness. Calm down, I tell myself, you are making a mountain out of a
molehill. This is life. Everyone else comes to term with it, why can’t you? Why can’t
you?”
She turns on him a tearful face. What does she want, he thinks? Does she want me
to answer her question for her?
They are not yet on the expressway. He pulls the car over, switches off the engine,
takes his mother in his arms. He inhales the smell of cold cream, of old flesh.
“There, there,” he whispers in her ear. “There, there. It will soon be over.” (69)
The “it” of the last sentence is ambiguous—the word could refer to Costello’s visit with her son,
her present agony, or her life, or any individual human life, or human suffering, or non-human
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suffering, or life in general, amongst other possibilities. But in all cases, her son’s response
attempts to placate her with the promise of “its” temporary nature, completely skirting the actual
subject of her pain and also not engaging her deep emotion. He doesn’t speak of family, of love,
of life, of animals. He doesn’t speak of his feelings, of his feelings for his mother. The ambiguity
of the “it” is symptomatic of his inability to engage his mother beyond the general and
superficial. The reductiveness of John’s response to his mother is glossed by the shorter
sentences and phrases that ventriloquize his point of view: Elizabeth’s opening sentences in this
passage are quite lyrical and comprise multiple different kinds of phrases. John, on the other
hand, is represented by staccato phrases, many in simple subject-verb-object form: “He pulls the
car over, switches off the engine, takes his mother in his arms. He inhales the small of cold
cream.”
John the scientist’s inadequate response to his mother’s pain, his refusal to engage it,
could represent reason’s inadequacy in the face of great emotion, reason’s inability to capture the
heterogeneity of consciousness and experience (recent critiques in composition studies of the
over-attention to logos at the expense of pathos suggest that rhetoric has also not escaped
reason’s hold5), and the subterfuges, displacements, and violences that are performed under the
sway of the ideology of reason. Indeed, during her debate with a philosopher at her son’s college,
Costello powerfully renounces reason “if reason is what sets me apart from the veal calf.” Which
brings us back to the argument about intelligence and humans at the top of the pyramid of animal
life. In What is Posthumanism?, animal studies scholar Cary Wolfe points to the circularity of
using the very criteria to privilege humans that should be under scrutiny in the first place: “our

82

www.cea-web.org

THE CEA FORUM

Winter/Spring
2017

shared embodiment, mortality, and finitude make us … 'fellow creatures' in ways that subsume
the more traditional markers of ethical consideration such as the capacity for reason, the ability
to enter into contractual agreements or reciprocal behaviors, … markers that have traditionally
created an ethical divide between Homo sapiens and everything (or everyone) else” (62). The
same could be said of the divide between the “scientific” and the “unscientific”—we cannot
deploy as a yardstick to evaluate the relative merits of the two sides of the divide the very
construction that was used to create the divide in the first place. And, indeed, as Cora Diamond
points out, critics who read Coetzee’s text only as an argument for animal rights and miss his
presentation of Costello herself as haunted, as a wounded animal, fall prey to the very privileging
of Cartesian logic that Costello (and the text) critique. The book The Lives of Animals includes
Coetzee’s Princeton University Tanner Lectures (Coetzee read his “novel” as the “Lectures,” the
latter called “The Lives of Animals”) followed by “essays” by four prominent intellectuals
responding to Coetzee’s lectures. Some of the four struggle with how to respond to “lectures” in
the form of a “novel,” some simply address Elizabeth Costello’s argument and ignore Coetzee’s
art, as if that art in itself weren’t a type of argument, and as if that art in itself hasn’t shaped the
way we see and hear and respond to Costello and what she represents.
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Pulling Back the Curtain
How are we (Jan and Ian, but also English faculty, humanities faculty, and all teachers) to
respond when we are confronted with Costello’s naysayers in our own classrooms?
Should we assert ever more forcefully the value of the humanities and humanities-based
knowledge and ways of knowing the world? Should we study up in the sciences on the topics of
our courses in order to meet our students on their own turf and embody the interdisciplinarity
that we like to pay lip service to?
Coetzee’s text suggests a different path. The Lives of Animals takes the form of fiction (a
fiction that reenacts Coetzee’s first presentation of the fiction as “lectures” at Princeton
University)—this genre choice is itself a testament to the capacity of art to do what science may
not be able to do. Perhaps Coetzee’s decision to present lectures-in-fiction or fiction-as-lectures
speaks to fiction’s power and possibilities? It seems our most scientifically-minded students
intuitively see or feel the power of art or the inadequacy of science to express, analyze, and
respond to particular texts, ideas, emotions, and feelings barely articulable. How else to explain
why some of the strongest of these students developed creative final projects (stories, photo
series) in Ian’s animal studies class when given free choice of genre and medium for the final
project? Were they yearning for an alternate form of expression? Was this a way for them to
express creativity and subjectivity in a socially- and academically-sanctioned way? Was it
perhaps an unconscious acknowledgment of the impossibility of neutral, objective, or value-free
inquiry? For the same students who chose to work on “creative” projects questioned and attacked
class members who wrote essays, excoriating them as “too subjective” or “not subjective
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enough”—almost as if the students who opted for creative projects did so to avoid the very
policing of subjectivity that they subjected the essay writers to, secure in their knowledge that
creative work was by definition subjective and thus believing it immune to this kind of scrutiny.
And, of course, these students’ retreats from writing essays and their misguided assumptions
about essays, also point toward the terrible ways in which English and other teachers have
constructed the academic essay as objective, impersonal, and distant.6
Having students across the disciplines actually do creative work is certainly one way to
invite them to experience effects and affects that other modes of production might not offer. But
we also want to bridge the apparent disconnect between students’ intellectual positions and their
unconscious understandings and embodied experiences. We want to bring the questions
regarding ways of knowing to their attention, asking questions of their “facts,” creating
opportunities for seeing multiple perspectives, for explicating various epistemological
affiliations, and for students to learn to identify and analyze their own affiliations, and to
recognize them as affiliations. But in doing so, do we run the risk of suggesting that these diverse
value systems form a pluralistic free for all? How do we encourage our scientific students and
colleagues to question their allegiances to “facts” without, at the same time, implying that their
opponents need to take facticity seriously?
Perhaps these questions themselves could become discussion topics in class, rather than
solely the basis of our behind-the-scenes hand wringing? By involving students in these debates,
we would not only be inviting them into our scholarly community (see Graff) but also showing
them how these questions are parts of larger conflicts around epistemology, knowledge,
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scholarship, and teaching; questions that are not settled, that resist the comfort of facile right and
wrong answers; but also questions that are an exciting and integral component of the critical
thinking that should form the core of their education.7
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Notes
1

For a critical take on big data, see O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data

Increases Inequality and Threatens Democracy.
2

For a concise recent summary of these critiques, see Braidotti Chapter 1. In some of the now

classic earlier scholarship, Sandra Harding, Donna Haraway, Vernon Rosario, and Trinh T.
Minh-ha have pointed, in particular, to the gendered and racialized nature of science’s supposed
universality and of people’s trust in science. In Decolonizing Methodologies, Linda Tuhiwai
Smith argues that the privileging of reason and logic are peculiar to Western cultures, and that
these values are hostile to many indigenous cultures. For a pointed exposé of the ways scientific
discourses can use the mantel of “expertise” to occlude vacuity, see Montague’s “How to Win
Any Argument: Pseudo-Scientific Neuro-Gibberish,” a worthy riposte to the Sokal scandal, the
supposed exposé of cutting-edge scholars’ empty poststructuralist jargon that gripped academe in
the 1990s when Social Text published a “nonsensical” article on quantum gravity.
3

The pairings include, for example, Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath with Ridley’s The

Rational Optimist, Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels and Polanyi’s Personal Knowledge, Stephenson’s
Snow Crash and McCloskey’s Bourgeois Dignity: Why Economics Can’t Explain the Modern
World, Zola’s Germinal and Hayek’s The Constitution of Liberty, Dostoevsky’s The Brothers
Karamazov and Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments.
4

Other examples of such cross-disciplinary interventions that come to mind include the field of

critical legal studies, where close readings of legal discourses was often undertaken by literary
scholars crossing disciplinary boundaries; and the ways in which ACT UP and other AIDS
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activists used rhetorical skills (both in their “reading” of official discourses and in their own
representations of themselves, the AIDS crisis, and AIDS as a disease) and self-education to
challenge the authority of scientific, medical, and governmental institutions in the US during the
1980s and 90s. In both cases, humanistic training, sensibility, and skills were used to critically
interrogate and even reimagine non-humanities disciplines and discourses.
5

See, e.g., Worsham. For a recent discussion of emotion in the humanities and humanities

scholarship more generally, see the PMLA special issue on emotion (130.5). The rise of Donald
Trump is surely a powerful lay illustration of the dangers of underestimating the power of
pathos, of assuming that voters would make logos-informed decisions, of the failure (on the part
of pollsters, political commentators, and Hillary Clinton) to adequately account for the role of
pathos in directing people’s imaginations and moving them to action.
6

For some classic and recent critiques of the ways in which the essay form is conventionally

constructed in college composition classes, and of the privileging of this version of the essay in
composition pedagogy, see Annas, Banks, Faris, Fort, Sirc, Weathers, Worsham. These critiques
also connect to scholarship that is critical of the dominant Western-centered (and Aristotleoriginating) construction of rhetorical history in the US (e.g., Baca, Powell).
7

We thank Holly Batty, Aneil Rallin, Morgan Read-Davidson, and Bart J. Wilson for suggesting

ideas and resources that helped us shape this article. We are also grateful to the anonymous
College English Association Forum reviewer for their feedback on an earlier version of this
article.
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